ISSN: X3080-020
ISSN: X3080-020
Aerospace & Defense is a multidisciplinary
academic journal of the Elrom Center for Policy Research and Strategy of Air, Space
and Security at Tel Aviv University. The journal serves as a unique research
platform for discussing issues of air, space, and security and promotes the
publication of research articles presenting analytical, critical, and
innovative perspectives. Taking a broad view of these topics, we consider
current developments, especially in technology, strategy, geopolitics,
military, and policy.
This article examines the necessary conceptual
shift in the Israeli Air Force’s (IAF) role in land border defense, based on
lessons learned from the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack. The study analyzes how
these events exposed significant gaps in air power’s role when confronting
extensive ground incursions through a mixed-methods approach combining
comparative case study analysis with doctrinal examination. The research
reveals that existing doctrine, based on separation between defensive and
offensive missions and over-reliance on intelligence and static defense
mechanisms, proved inadequate against sudden, multi-front threats (Lupovici, 2024). The findings indicate a critical need to
transition from viewing the Air Force as a supporting element to a leading
force providing comprehensive border defense responses, particularly in
scenarios involving coordinated mass infiltrations into populated border areas
(Finkel, 2024). The study proposes a new framework integrating real-time
situational awareness, rapid lethal response capabilities, and enhanced
air-ground operational coordination specifically for large-scale coordinated
attacks. The conclusions emphasize the importance of a paradigm shift from
reactive to proactive, comprehensive air-centric border defense doctrine that
distinguishes between routine security operations and responses to coordinated
military-style assaults.
For approximately two decades, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) force buildup has relied on threat-based planning, grounded in specific threats and scenarios. This approach emerged as the risk of state military invasions into Israel diminished, while the threat posed by the Iran-led axis, including Hezbollah and Hamas, increased. Following the Gaza War (Iron Swords), a new strategic reality has unfolded in the Middle East. On one hand, the primary threats that shaped much of Israel's force buildup have significantly weakened. On the other hand, the emergence of new actors and the potential instability of regimes could disrupt the existing order and give rise to new threats. A comparable strategic situation arose for U.S. force developers after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In response to uncertainty about future scenarios, they opted for capabilities-based planning, emphasizing versatile capabilities over specific threats. This article proposes re-evaluating Israel’s force-building approach by integrating capabilities-based planning, focused on generic missions, alongside the use of specific scenarios as benchmarks for assessing the validity of force-building decisions.
Read moreThe events of the Arab Spring and Egypt’s internal crises between 2011 and 2013 undermined Egypt’s standing in the international arena and affected its internal stability. Since 2014, the country has faced complex strategic challenges that include social and economic crises, regional pressures, a decline in its role as a leader in the Arab world, the expansion of civil wars near its borders, and increasing domestic threats from terrorist organizations jeopardizing its stability. Consequently, Egypt’s national interests have been adapted and transformed to ensure regime survival and to strengthen the country. This article examines how this reality is reflected in the Egyptian Air Force. To this end, it analyzes the three main areas in which the Air Force has operated over the past decade: participation in regional and international coalitions; counterterrorism operations; and force build-up with various objectives. It is argued that the Egyptian Air Force constitutes a central element within the armed forces for advancing these national interests. The primary conclusion is that the Egyptian Air Force today is not merely an aerial component within the military apparatus. Rather, it also serves as an instrument for projecting and consolidating Egypt’s power both domestically and regionally. This case highlights a broader phenomenon observed in many countries in the 21st century, where air power functions not only as a military tool but also as a strategic instrument in advancing national policy. The study aims to highlight this phenomenon, addressing the intersection between the military, society, and regional and international interests.
Read more This article advances a dynamic taxonomy for
analyzing Strategic Partnerships (SPs) in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), challenging the prevailing tendency to treat them as a generic
category. It distinguishes between two intermediary forms of alignment—hyper-transactionalism
and semi-alliance—and
classifies SPs along two analytical dimensions: the presence or absence of
strategic intent and their primary functional orientation, whether economic or
security-related. A central finding of the study is the increasing prominence
of air and space cooperation within MENA-based SPs. These domains function as
key vectors through which global powers project asymmetric influence while
enabling regional states to bypass technological constraints and expedite access
to advanced capabilities such as UAVs, satellite systems, and precision-guided
technologies. Drawing on case studies of Russian and Chinese SPs in the region,
the article demonstrates that air and space collaboration acts as a strategic
force multiplier. The proposed taxonomy provides scholars and policymakers with
a more nuanced analytical framework for assessing the depth, durability, and
transformative potential of emerging alignments within MENA’s swiftly evolving
security architecture.
The operation of the Israeli Air Force in the Iron Swords War in Gaza was a departure from the IDF’s airpower concept of operations (CONOPS), which, since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, has focused primarily on the use of airpower to erode the enemy’s military capabilities while also providing support for ground troops in combat. However, in Gaza the task of aiding the ground troops became the Air Force’s primary mission, and the number of targets attacked was greater than in any of Israel’s wars to date. This article will try to analyze the roots of this change and discern what might be learned from the operation itself as to the operating concept that is best for the operation of airpower in general – and specifically the Israeli Air Force - in future combat. This analysis has shown that the operation of the Air Force differed from the CONOPS primarily because of the goals of the war, the civilian surroundings in which the enemy operated (above and below ground), and the integration between air and ground forces, as it has developed over recent years. Therefore I propose to distinguish between conclusions that apply to the operation of airpower in urban terrain and conclusions that apply to the Israeli Air Force’s general CONOPS. With regard to operation in urban environments, the article employed the methodology of comparing the Iron Swords War and the war against ISIS in Mosul and Raqqa, and presented the large scope of strikes required to support ground forces, the limitations of airpower in inflicting physical damage on enemy forces, and the inevitable harm to civilian populations. The IAF’s CONOPS must address a multitude of varying arenas that are very different from the Palestinian arena - both in their goals and in the nature of the operative environment.
In these arenas, airpower will constitute the larger share of military force deployed, and the solution required will be based on principles from previous CONOPS, begging means and methods that differ greatly from those needed in Gaza.
This article explores the offensive air support the Israeli Air Force, mainly by using its fighter jets, provided to maneuvering ground
forces during the key combat stages of the Iron Swords War in Gaza. Following a brief overview of the history of air-ground
cooperation and a detailed analysis of the developments in offensive air support over the decade preceding the conflict, the article argues
that the offensive air support provided in this war was exceptionally
effective in relation to Israel’s military history.
This success is attributed to several factors, including prewar force-design processes and training, procedural adjustments
implemented during the conflict, the extensive allocation of munitions by the Air Force, and unique conditions specific to the
Gaza combat environment. Additionally, the article suggests that the nature of air support in this war reflects a cultural shift within
the Air Force, where success is now measured by the achievements of maneuvering ground forces. The discussion then compares this
conflict with the Second Lebanon War (2006), the Gaza Operations Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Protective Edge (2014).
The article concludes with insights on offensive air support in the context of a potential future war in Lebanon, which could involve large-scale
ground maneuvers.
Attack helicopters are suitable for a wide array of defense and offense scenarios. Over the past two decades, they have been proven necessary in various wars worldwide, including the Russia-Ukraine and Iron Swords wars. However, limitations in operating attack helicopters and technological progress leading to a new variety of solutions for operational needs in the modern-day battlefield have changed the array of solutions provided. Other than helicopters, this includes using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for attacking and interdiction mobile targets, hovercraft assigned to ground forces for aerial intelligence and precision bombing, and other means such as guided munitions. As part of any modern army’s considerations of procurement of highly technological weapons and the need to balance the variety of arms available for achieving its war goals, this article focuses on the cost-effectiveness of the attack helicopter when compared with available alternatives as a study case for this question. The article reviews the integration of attack helicopters in modern warfare, analyzes their attributes and capabilities, and discusses the central implications of this question, including the cost of ownership, relative vulnerability, and the alternatives evolving today.
Read more The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, incorporated powered paragliders as a tactical element in an air assault on Israel. Gliding over the ground barrier, these paragliders intensified the attack’s impact. Despite Israel’s air superiority, this successful air assault exposed vulnerabilities within Israel’s advanced defense systems. This article examines the air assault threat to Israel, specifically from parachuting and gliding, to assess its potential impact and evaluate Israel’s preparedness to counter it. The article argues that the Israeli Air Force had not previously recognized air assault as a substantial threat and was, therefore, unprepared to respond to it on October 7. To support this claim, the article explores Hamas’s development of powered paragliders as a technological reduction strategy designed to limit Israel’s ability to fully leverage its air defense systems during the attack. It then traces the evolution of fighter deployment platforms, focusing on powered paragliders and the distinctive features that make them effective tools for air assault operations. Following this, the article discusses the factors heightening Israel’s vulnerability to such threats, assessing the country’s current preparedness and exploring the broader implications for international security. Finally, the article offers recommendations for countering the specific air assault risks posed by powered paragliders.
The past thirty years have seen the accelerated development of global digital platforms - invested hugely by commercial companies - penetrating every aspect of our lives. Similarly to the civilian realm, global digital platforms may also be used in the military dimension, in which case we will term the battlefield-adapted product Digital Weaponry. These kinds of weapons are usually civilian platforms which have undergone software adaptations and military adjustments in areas such as navigation, intelligence, communications, sensing and warning, psychological warfare, and virtual attacks. The cutting-edge technology on which these apps are based, combined with the simplicity and minimal cost of converting them from the civilian to the military realms, is what lies at the foundation of their potential to wield systematic influence on the battlefield.
Clayton Christensen’s theory on disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997), its adaptation to the military arena by Gautam Mukunda (Mukunda, 2010), and the test cases of the Russia-Ukraine war and the Swords of Iron War between Israel and Hamas in Gaza enabled us to examine how digital weapons have penetrated the modern battlefield, as well as their potential impact on this battlefield and on the global balance of military power. We point out that digital weapons could potentially constitute disruptive innovation on the military battlefield; that it is highly likely that the first actors likely to develop and use it in a transformative way on the battlefield will be low-resource organizations, rather than large and technologically superior military-security establishments; and that due to the convergence of these two trends, digital weaponry has the potential to lead to a certain shift of the global balance of power between military powers with technological supremacy, and terrorist organizations or small countries - at least in several aspects of the modern battlefield.