In both surprise attacks on Israel – the Egyptian-Syrian offensive of October 6, 1973, and the Hamas offensive of October 7, 2023 – the Israeli Air Force’s contribution to halting the enemy ground forces was limited. The two cases differ in many respects, yet they share a common denominator regarding air support. The IDF’s defensive concept relied on the ground forces conducting the main defense battle, with a certain level of air support, while the Air Force’s mission was to attack targets according to requirements of the supported headquarters at the regional commands and divisional level. In both surprise offensives, the ground forces failed to stop the enemy forces. The Air Force was therefore required to assume a significant role in the defense battle, but the supported headquarters, fully engaged in the fighting, were unable to provide the Air Force with targets and intelligence in an effective manner. Both surprise offensives constituted extreme cases of the need for air support in terms of its decisive importance for the ground combat. Yet in these two unique cases in IDF history, the ground forces did not receive adequate air support precisely when it was most needed. The article argues that a primary reason for this is the failure of the IDF’s air support concept, which considered air support mainly as providing an optimal, rapid, and precise fulfillment of ad hoc requirements from the ground forces. When appropriate requests for support did not reach the Air Force, effective support was impossible. An alternative approach to air support is one that is oriented not only to optimal fulfillment of requirements during combat but also, and primarily, to force design that is optimized to the needs of the ground forces. The force buildup process should be based on a deep, shared understanding by the Air Force, the ground forces, and the regional commands of the needs in ground combat and of the strengths and limitations of air power. This approach has prevailed in relatively short periods during the history of the IAF, such as from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, and it has the potential to guide the future force buildup for air support. The establishment of the Air Support and Border Defense Division in the Israeli Air Force represents an opportunity to renew this approach.

This study explores how ambidextrous leadership theory explains differences in the Israeli Air Force (IAF) crisis response effectiveness during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2023 October 7th attack by Hamas. Using a comparative case study approach, the research shows that commanders’ inability to balance exploitative and explorative behaviors led to failures in the initial response. Traditional military leadership methods proved inadequate when facing situations that require maintaining operational continuity while also pursuing tactical innovation. Key findings indicate that cognitive flexibility, quick learning, and adaptive resource management are essential for effective crisis response. The study highlights ongoing organizational biases toward exploitation rather than exploration, despite fifty years of technological progress. This research is the first systematic application of ambidextrous leadership theory to military aviation crisis response, adapting civilian organizational ideas to suit military command needs. Practical implications include recommendations for personnel selection, simulation-based training, and organizational changes to improve crisis preparedness.

The wars in Ukraine and Israel have been shaped by persistent missile, rocket, and drone attacks on civilian and military targets, illustrating the return of total warfare. This article investigates why and how different states withstand aerial coercion and develops a three-tier analytical framework of active defense (interception), passive defense (early warning, shelters, functional continuity mechanisms), and offensive defense (degrading enemy strike capacity at its source). We argue that the degree of integration across these layers shapes home-front endurance, and we demonstrate this through a comparison of Ukraine, marked by wartime adaptation under material scarcity, and Israel, where pre-war institutionalization enabled rapid but at times uneven adaptation after October 7. Drawing on open-source data, policy and media materials, and interviews with officials, practitioners, and civil society actors, we show that variations in defense integration affect each case’s defense trajectory and performance. The findings contribute to scholarly debates on coercion, resilience, and adaptation in air warfare and offer an empirical basis for shaping defense integration in other high-threat environments.