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The Role of Airpower in Battle: Some Preliminary Insights from Combat in Gaza in the “Iron Swords” War
Assaf Heller

The operation of the Israeli Air Force in the Iron Swords War in Gaza was a departure from the IDF’s airpower concept of operations (CONOPS), which, since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, has focused primarily on the use of airpower to erode the enemy’s military capabilities while also providing support for ground troops in combat. However, in Gaza the task of aiding the ground troops became the Air Force’s primary mission, and the number of targets attacked was greater than in any of Israel’s wars to date. This article will try to analyze the roots of this change and discern what might be learned from the operation itself as to the operating concept that is best for the operation of airpower in general – and specifically the Israeli Air Force - in future combat. This analysis has shown that the operation of the Air Force differed from the CONOPS primarily because of the goals of the war, the civilian surroundings in which the enemy operated (above and below ground), and the integration between air and ground forces, as it has developed over recent years. Therefore I propose to distinguish between conclusions that apply to the operation of airpower in urban terrain and conclusions that apply to the Israeli Air Force’s general CONOPS. With regard to operation in urban environments, the article employed the methodology of comparing the Iron Swords War and the war against ISIS in Mosul and Raqqa, and presented the large scope of strikes required to support ground forces, the limitations of airpower in inflicting physical damage on enemy forces, and the inevitable harm to civilian populations. The IAF’s CONOPS must address a multitude of varying arenas that are very different from the Palestinian arena - both in their goals and in the nature of the operative environment.

In these arenas, airpower will constitute the larger share of military force deployed, and the solution required will be based on principles from previous CONOPS, begging means and methods that differ greatly from those needed in Gaza.

This article explores the offensive air support the Israeli Air Force, mainly by using its fighter jets, provided to maneuvering ground
forces during the key combat stages of the Iron Swords War in Gaza. Following a brief overview of the history of air-ground
cooperation and a detailed analysis of the developments in offensive air support over the decade preceding the conflict, the article argues
that the offensive air support provided in this war was exceptionally
effective in relation to Israel’s military history.
This success is attributed to several factors, including prewar force-design processes and training, procedural adjustments
implemented during the conflict, the extensive allocation of munitions by the Air Force, and unique conditions specific to the
Gaza combat environment. Additionally, the article suggests that the nature of air support in this war reflects a cultural shift within
the Air Force, where success is now measured by the achievements of maneuvering ground forces. The discussion then compares this
conflict with the Second Lebanon War (2006), the Gaza Operations Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Protective Edge (2014).
The article concludes with insights on offensive air support in the context of a potential future war in Lebanon, which could involve large-scale
ground maneuvers.

Attack helicopters are suitable for a wide array of defense and offense scenarios. Over the past two decades, they have been proven necessary in various wars worldwide, including the Russia-Ukraine and Iron Swords wars. However, limitations in operating attack helicopters and technological progress leading to a new variety of solutions for operational needs in the modern-day battlefield have changed the array of solutions provided. Other than helicopters, this includes using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for attacking and interdiction mobile targets, hovercraft assigned to ground forces for aerial intelligence and precision bombing, and other means such as guided munitions. As part of any modern army’s considerations of procurement of highly technological weapons and the need to balance the variety of arms available for achieving its war goals, this article focuses on the cost-effectiveness of the attack helicopter when compared with available alternatives as a study case for this question. The article reviews the integration of attack helicopters in modern warfare, analyzes their attributes and capabilities, and discusses the central implications of this question, including the cost of ownership, relative vulnerability, and the alternatives evolving today.

The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, incorporated powered paragliders as a tactical element in an air assault on Israel. Gliding over the ground barrier, these paragliders intensified the attack’s impact. Despite Israel’s air superiority, this successful air assault exposed vulnerabilities within Israel’s advanced defense systems. This article examines the air assault threat to Israel, specifically from parachuting and gliding, to assess its potential impact and evaluate Israel’s preparedness to counter it. The article argues that the Israeli Air Force had not previously recognized air assault as a substantial threat and was, therefore, unprepared to respond to it on October 7. To support this claim, the article explores Hamas’s development of powered paragliders as a technological reduction strategy designed to limit Israel’s ability to fully leverage its air defense systems during the attack. It then traces the evolution of fighter deployment platforms, focusing on powered paragliders and the distinctive features that make them effective tools for air assault operations. Following this, the article discusses the factors heightening Israel’s vulnerability to such threats, assessing the country’s current preparedness and exploring the broader implications for international security. Finally, the article offers recommendations for countering the specific air assault risks posed by powered paragliders.

The past thirty years have seen the accelerated development of global digital platforms - invested hugely by commercial companies - penetrating every aspect of our lives. Similarly to the civilian realm, global digital platforms may also be used in the military dimension, in which case we will term the battlefield-adapted product Digital Weaponry. These kinds of weapons are usually civilian platforms which have undergone software adaptations and military adjustments in areas such as navigation, intelligence, communications, sensing and warning, psychological warfare, and virtual attacks. The cutting-edge technology on which these apps are based, combined with the simplicity and minimal cost of converting them from the civilian to the military realms, is what lies at the foundation of their potential to wield systematic influence on the battlefield.

Clayton Christensen’s theory on disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997), its adaptation to the military arena by Gautam Mukunda (Mukunda, 2010), and the test cases of the Russia-Ukraine war and the Swords of Iron War between Israel and Hamas in Gaza enabled us to examine how digital weapons have penetrated the modern battlefield, as well as their potential impact on this battlefield and on the global balance of military power. We point out that digital weapons could potentially constitute disruptive innovation on the military battlefield; that it is highly likely that the first actors likely to develop and use it in a transformative way on the battlefield will be low-resource organizations, rather than large and technologically superior military-security establishments; and that due to the convergence of these two trends, digital weaponry has the potential to lead to a certain shift of the global balance of power between military powers with technological supremacy, and terrorist organizations or small countries - at least in several aspects of the modern battlefield.