{"id":50,"date":"2024-06-26T11:10:00","date_gmt":"2024-06-26T11:10:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/socsci4.tau.ac.il\/mu2\/elrommagazine-eng\/%d7%91%d7%99%d7%aa\/"},"modified":"2026-01-25T09:27:48","modified_gmt":"2026-01-25T09:27:48","slug":"home","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/socsci4.tau.ac.il\/mu2\/elrommagazine-eng\/","title":{"rendered":"Home"},"content":{"rendered":"\n \n
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Aerospace & Defense is a multidisciplinary\nacademic journal of the Elrom Center for Policy Research and Strategy of Air, Space\nand Security at Tel Aviv University. The journal serves as a unique research\nplatform for discussing issues of air, space, and security and promotes the\npublication of research articles presenting analytical, critical, and\ninnovative perspectives. Taking a broad view of these topics, we consider\ncurrent developments, especially in technology, strategy, geopolitics,\nmilitary, and policy.
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\n Download the firstissue November 2024<\/a>\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

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\n Vol. 2(2)
<\/span>December 2025 Download<\/span>\n <\/a>\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

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\n <\/b>October 7th \u2013 Learning\nBeyond Debriefing: A Topological Framework for Laying Out Crisis-Inducing\nSurprise Scenarios for the Israeli Air Force<\/span>\n
<\/span><\/b>Eviatar Matania<\/b><\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path>\n<\/g>\n<\/g><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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The purpose of this article is to\nlay the groundwork for learning from the October 7th scenario for future,\nunknown scenarios that may differ in their manifestation yet share the core\nelement of a surprise attack that prevents the Air Force from realizing its\nfull potential for at least several hours\u2014a situation this article defines as a\n\u201dcrisis-inducing surprise.\u201d To this end, a unique methodology has been\ndeveloped to move from the particular\u2014the specific incursion that occurred on\nOctober 7th\u2014to the general: surprise attack scenarios accompanied by an\noperational crisis for the Air Force lasting at least several hours. This is\nachieved through a topology that maps the space of crisis-inducing surprise\nscenarios along two axes, following the rationale of \u201dfrom where and to where\u201d:\nthe dimension in which a surprise incursion might occur and the primary target\nof the attack. The article clarifies how this topology is both suitable and\ncomplete for a learning process and demonstrates its application. It subsequently\nproposes the following: (1) Utilizing the proposed topology for force-design\nand preparedness for nine extreme scenarios, according to the rubrics of the\nmapped space, will enable the Air Force to be ready for nearly any combination\nthereof, allowing it to function semi-automatically in the initial hours of a\nsurprise attack and thereby significantly mitigating the crisis during a future\nfundamental surprise. (2) In order to avoid irreversible damage during a\nsurprise attack stemming from a situational surprise, the Air Force must forgo\nits reliance on early warning for the protection of itself, its capabilities,\nand its assets.
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\n <\/span>Air Support in Ground Combat: Meeting\nRequirements or Needs?\nLessons from the Israeli Air Force\u2019s Confrontation with Two\nSurprise Ground Offensives<\/span>\n
Assaf Heller  
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In both surprise attacks on Israel \u2013\nthe Egyptian-Syrian offensive of October 6, 1973, and the Hamas offensive of\nOctober 7, 2023 \u2013 the Israeli Air Force\u2019s contribution to halting the enemy\nground forces was limited. The two cases differ in many respects, yet they\nshare a common denominator regarding air support. The IDF\u2019s defensive concept\nrelied on the ground forces conducting the main defense battle, with a certain\nlevel of air support, while the Air Force\u2019s mission was to attack targets\naccording to requirements of the supported headquarters at the regional\ncommands and divisional level. In both surprise offensives, the ground forces\nfailed to stop the enemy forces. The Air Force was therefore required to assume\na significant role in the defense battle, but the supported headquarters, fully\nengaged in the fighting, were unable to provide the Air Force with targets and\nintelligence in an effective manner.\nBoth surprise offensives constituted\nextreme cases of the need for air support in terms of its decisive importance\nfor the ground combat. Yet in these two unique cases in IDF history, the ground\nforces did not receive adequate air support precisely when it was most needed.\nThe article argues that a primary reason for this is the failure of the IDF\u2019s\nair support concept, which considered air support mainly as providing an\noptimal, rapid, and precise fulfillment of ad hoc requirements from the ground\nforces. When appropriate requests for support did not reach the Air Force,\neffective support was impossible.\nAn alternative approach to air\nsupport is one that is oriented not only to optimal fulfillment of requirements\nduring combat but also, and primarily, to force design that is optimized to the\nneeds of the ground forces. The force buildup process should be based on a\ndeep, shared understanding by the Air Force, the ground forces, and the\nregional commands of the needs in ground combat and of the strengths and\nlimitations of air power. This approach has prevailed in relatively short\nperiods during the history of the IAF, such as from the mid-1980s to the\nmid-1990s, and it has the potential to guide the future force buildup for air\nsupport. The establishment of the Air Support and Border Defense Division in\nthe Israeli Air Force represents an opportunity to renew this approach.<\/p>\n Read more <\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

\n <\/b><\/b> Ambidextrous Leadership in Military Aviation: A Comparative Analysis of\nIsraeli Air Force Crisis Response During the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2023 October\n7th Attack  <\/span>\n
Alex Dan<\/span><\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path>\n<\/g>\n<\/g><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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This study explores how\nambidextrous leadership theory explains differences in the Israeli Air Force\n(IAF) crisis response effectiveness during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2023\nOctober 7th attack by Hamas. Using a comparative case study\napproach, the research shows that commanders\u2019 inability to balance exploitative\nand explorative behaviors led to failures in the initial response. Traditional\nmilitary leadership methods proved inadequate when facing situations that\nrequire maintaining operational continuity while also pursuing tactical\ninnovation.\nKey findings indicate\nthat cognitive flexibility, quick learning, and adaptive resource management\nare essential for effective crisis response. The study highlights ongoing\norganizational biases toward exploitation rather than exploration, despite\nfifty years of technological progress. This research is the first systematic\napplication of ambidextrous leadership theory to military aviation crisis\nresponse, adapting civilian organizational ideas to suit military command\nneeds. Practical implications include recommendations for personnel selection,\nsimulation-based training, and organizational changes to improve crisis\npreparedness.<\/p>\n Read more <\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

\n <\/b>Integrating active, Passive, and offensive defense: a comparative study of Ukraine and Israel (2022-2025) <\/span>\n
Sarah Fainberg, Yuval Peleg and Tomer Fadlon <\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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The wars in\nUkraine and Israel have been shaped by persistent missile, rocket, and drone\nattacks on civilian and military targets, illustrating the return of total\nwarfare. This article investigates why and how different states withstand\naerial coercion and develops a three-tier analytical framework of active\ndefense (interception), passive defense (early warning, shelters, functional\ncontinuity mechanisms), and offensive defense (degrading enemy strike capacity\nat its source). We argue that the degree of integration across these layers\nshapes home-front endurance, and we demonstrate this through a comparison of\nUkraine, marked by wartime adaptation under material scarcity, and Israel,\nwhere pre-war institutionalization enabled rapid but at times uneven adaptation\nafter October 7. Drawing on open-source data, policy and media materials, and\ninterviews with officials, practitioners, and civil society actors, we show that\nvariations in defense integration affect each case\u2019s defense trajectory and\nperformance. The findings contribute to scholarly debates on coercion,\nresilience, and adaptation in air warfare and offer an empirical basis for shaping\ndefense integration in other high-threat environments. 
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\n Download the firstissue November 2024<\/a>\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

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\n Vol.2(1)<\/span>\n
September 2025 Download<\/span>\n <\/a>\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

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\n A Conceptual Shift in the Air Force: Lessons\nfrom October 7, 2023  <\/b>\n
Alex Dan<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path>\n<\/g>\n<\/g><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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This article examines the necessary conceptual\nshift in the Israeli Air Force\u2019s (IAF) role in land border defense, based on\nlessons learned from the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack. The study analyzes how\nthese events exposed significant gaps in air power\u2019s role when confronting\nextensive ground incursions through a mixed-methods approach combining\ncomparative case study analysis with doctrinal examination. The research\nreveals that existing doctrine, based on separation between defensive and\noffensive missions and over-reliance on intelligence and static defense\nmechanisms, proved inadequate against sudden, multi-front threats (Lupovici, 2024). The findings indicate a critical need to\ntransition from viewing the Air Force as a supporting element to a leading\nforce providing comprehensive border defense responses, particularly in\nscenarios involving coordinated mass infiltrations into populated border areas\n(Finkel, 2024). The study proposes a new framework integrating real-time\nsituational awareness, rapid lethal response capabilities, and enhanced\nair-ground operational coordination specifically for large-scale coordinated\nattacks. The conclusions emphasize the importance of a paradigm shift from\nreactive to proactive, comprehensive air-centric border defense doctrine that\ndistinguishes between routine security operations and responses to coordinated\nmilitary-style assaults.
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\n <\/span>The Vanishing Enemy: Force Buildup in Israel Post Hezbollah,\n Hamas, <\/b> the\n Assad Regime<\/b>, <\/b>and the Campaign <\/b>Aagainst Iran<\/b>  
Assaf Heller and Omer Dank      <\/b>\n
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For\napproximately two decades, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) force buildup has\nrelied on threat-based planning, grounded in specific threats and scenarios.\nThis approach emerged as the risk of state military invasions into Israel\ndiminished, while the threat posed by the Iran-led axis, including Hezbollah\nand Hamas, increased. Following the Gaza War (Iron Swords), a new strategic\nreality has unfolded in the Middle East. On one hand, the primary threats that\nshaped much of Israel's force buildup have significantly weakened. On the other\nhand, the emergence of new actors and the potential instability of regimes\ncould disrupt the existing order and give rise to new threats. A comparable\nstrategic situation arose for U.S. force developers after the collapse of the\nSoviet Union. In response to uncertainty about future scenarios, they opted for\ncapabilities-based planning, emphasizing versatile capabilities over specific\nthreats. This article proposes re-evaluating Israel\u2019s force-building approach\nby integrating capabilities-based planning, focused on generic missions,\nalongside the use of specific scenarios as benchmarks for assessing the\nvalidity of force-building decisions.<\/p>\n Read more <\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

\n Like a Raging\nStorm: The Egyptian Air Force as a Key Instrument in Advancing Egypt\u2019s Revised\nNational Interests Following the Revolutionary Years<\/b> <\/b>\n
Yuval Peleg and Yirmi Shifferman <\/span><\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path>\n<\/g>\n<\/g><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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The events of the Arab Spring and Egypt\u2019s internal crises between\n2011 and 2013 undermined Egypt\u2019s standing in the international arena and\naffected its internal stability. Since 2014, the country has faced complex\nstrategic challenges that include social and economic crises, regional\npressures, a decline in its role as a leader in the Arab world, the expansion\nof civil wars near its borders, and increasing domestic threats from terrorist\norganizations jeopardizing its stability. Consequently, Egypt\u2019s national\ninterests have been adapted and transformed to ensure regime survival and to\nstrengthen the country. This article examines how this reality is reflected in\nthe Egyptian Air Force. To this end, it analyzes the three main areas in which\nthe Air Force has operated over the past decade: participation in regional and\ninternational coalitions; counterterrorism operations; and force build-up with\nvarious objectives. It is argued that the Egyptian Air Force constitutes a\ncentral element within the armed forces for advancing these national interests.\nThe primary conclusion is that the Egyptian Air Force today is not merely an\naerial component within the military apparatus. Rather, it also serves as an\ninstrument for projecting and consolidating Egypt\u2019s power both domestically and\nregionally. This case highlights a broader phenomenon observed in many\ncountries in the 21st century, where air power functions not only as a military\ntool but also as a strategic instrument in advancing national policy. The study\naims to highlight this phenomenon, addressing the intersection between the\nmilitary, society, and regional and international interests.<\/p>\n Read more <\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

\n Ad Hoc or Enduring? A Dynamic Taxonomy of Strategic Partnerships in\nthe Middle East and North Africa<\/b> <\/b>\n
Sarah Fainberg\nand Eviatar Matania<\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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This article advances a dynamic taxonomy for\nanalyzing Strategic Partnerships (SPs) in the Middle East and North Africa\n(MENA), challenging the prevailing tendency to treat them as a generic\ncategory. It distinguishes between two intermediary forms of alignment\u2014hyper-transactionalism\nand semi-alliance\u2014and\nclassifies SPs along two analytical dimensions: the presence or absence of\nstrategic intent and their primary functional orientation, whether economic or\nsecurity-related. A central finding of the study is the increasing prominence\nof air and space cooperation within MENA-based SPs. These domains function as\nkey vectors through which global powers project asymmetric influence while\nenabling regional states to bypass technological constraints and expedite access\nto advanced capabilities such as UAVs, satellite systems, and precision-guided\ntechnologies. Drawing on case studies of Russian and Chinese SPs in the region,\nthe article demonstrates that air and space collaboration acts as a strategic\nforce multiplier. The proposed taxonomy provides scholars and policymakers with\na more nuanced analytical framework for assessing the depth, durability, and\ntransformative potential of emerging alignments within MENA\u2019s swiftly evolving\nsecurity architecture.<\/b>\n
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\n Download the firstissue November 2024<\/a>\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

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\n Vol.1(1)<\/span>\n
November 2024 Download<\/span>\n <\/a>\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

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\n The Role of Airpower\nin Battle: Some Preliminary Insights from Combat in Gaza in the \u201cIron Swords\u201d\nWar<\/b> 
Assaf Heller<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path>\n<\/g>\n<\/g><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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The operation of the Israeli Air Force in the Iron Swords War in Gaza was a departure from the IDF\u2019s airpower concept of operations (CONOPS), which, since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, has focused primarily on the use of airpower to erode the enemy\u2019s military capabilities while also providing support for ground troops in combat. However, in Gaza the task of aiding the ground troops became the Air Force\u2019s primary mission, and the number of targets attacked was greater than in any of Israel\u2019s wars to date. This article will try to analyze the roots of this change and discern what might be learned from the operation itself as to the operating concept that is best for the operation of airpower in general \u2013 and specifically the Israeli Air Force - in future combat. This analysis has shown that the operation of the Air Force differed from the CONOPS primarily because of the goals of the war, the civilian surroundings in which the enemy operated (above and below ground), and the integration between air and ground forces, as it has developed over recent years. Therefore I propose to distinguish between conclusions that apply to the operation of airpower in urban terrain and conclusions that apply to the Israeli Air Force\u2019s general CONOPS. With regard to operation in urban environments, the article employed the methodology of comparing the Iron Swords War and the war against ISIS in Mosul and Raqqa, and presented the large scope of strikes required to support ground forces, the limitations of airpower in inflicting physical damage on enemy forces, and the inevitable harm to civilian populations. The IAF\u2019s CONOPS must address a multitude of varying arenas that are very different from the Palestinian arena - both in their goals and in the nature of the operative environment. 
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In these arenas, airpower will constitute the larger share of military force deployed, and the solution required will be based on principles from previous CONOPS, begging means and methods that differ greatly from those needed in Gaza.
 
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\n <\/span>Not a \u201cWar of Its Own\u201d: Offensive Air Support for the Maneuvering Forces in the Iron Swords War in Gaza Factors of Success and Looking Ahead <\/span>\n
Meir Finkel<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path>\n<\/g>\n<\/g><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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This article explores the offensive air support the Israeli Air Force, mainly by using its fighter jets, provided to maneuvering ground
forces during the key combat stages of the Iron Swords War in Gaza. Following a brief overview of the history of air-ground
cooperation and a detailed analysis of the developments in offensive air support over the decade preceding the conflict, the article argues
that the offensive air support provided in this war was exceptionally
effective in relation to Israel\u2019s military history.
This success is attributed to several factors, including prewar force-design processes and training, procedural adjustments
implemented during the conflict, the extensive allocation of munitions by the Air Force, and unique conditions specific to the
Gaza combat environment. Additionally, the article suggests that the nature of air support in this war reflects a cultural shift within
the Air Force, where success is now measured by the achievements of maneuvering ground forces. The discussion then compares this
conflict with the Second Lebanon War (2006), the Gaza Operations Cast Lead (2008\u20132009) and Protective Edge (2014).
The article concludes with insights on offensive air support in the context of a potential future war in Lebanon, which could involve large-scale
ground maneuvers.\n <\/p>\n Read more <\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

\n The Need for Attack Helicopters: Characteristics and Challenges in\nthe Era of Modern Warfare<\/b>\n
Alex Dan<\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path>\n<\/g>\n<\/g><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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Attack helicopters are suitable for a wide array of defense and offense scenarios. Over the past two decades, they have been proven necessary in various wars worldwide, including the Russia-Ukraine and Iron Swords wars. However, limitations in operating attack helicopters and technological progress leading to a new variety of solutions for operational needs in the modern-day battlefield have changed the array of solutions provided. Other than helicopters, this includes using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for attacking and interdiction mobile targets, hovercraft assigned to ground forces for aerial intelligence and precision bombing, and other means such as guided munitions. As part of any modern army\u2019s considerations of procurement of highly technological weapons and the need to balance the variety of arms available for achieving its war goals, this article focuses on the cost-effectiveness of the attack helicopter when compared with available alternatives as a study case for this question. The article reviews the integration of attack helicopters in modern warfare, analyzes their attributes and capabilities, and discusses the central implications of this question, including the cost of ownership, relative vulnerability, and the alternatives evolving today.<\/p>\n Read more <\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

\n Powered Paragliders and the Air Assault Threat to Israel<\/b>\n
Ehud Langer<\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, incorporated powered paragliders as a tactical element in an air assault on Israel. Gliding over the ground barrier, these paragliders intensified the attack\u2019s impact. Despite Israel\u2019s air superiority, this successful air assault exposed vulnerabilities within Israel\u2019s advanced defense systems. This article examines the air assault threat to Israel, specifically from parachuting and gliding, to assess its potential impact and evaluate Israel\u2019s preparedness to counter it. The article argues that the Israeli Air Force had not previously recognized air assault as a substantial threat and was, therefore, unprepared to respond to it on October 7. To support this claim, the article explores Hamas\u2019s development of powered paragliders as a technological reduction strategy designed to limit Israel\u2019s ability to fully leverage its air defense systems during the attack. It then traces the evolution of fighter deployment platforms, focusing on powered paragliders and the distinctive features that make them effective tools for air assault operations. Following this, the article discusses the factors heightening Israel\u2019s vulnerability to such threats, assessing the country\u2019s current preparedness and exploring the broader implications for international security. Finally, the article offers recommendations for countering the specific air assault risks posed by powered paragliders. 
\n <\/p>\n Read more <\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n

\n Digital Weapons: How Global Digital Platforms May Potentially Disrupt the Modern Battlefield<\/span>\n
Eviatar Matania and Alon Berkman<\/span><\/span><\/use><\/svg><\/path><\/svg><\/span>\n <\/a>\n
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The past thirty years have seen the accelerated development of global digital platforms - invested hugely by commercial companies - penetrating every aspect of our lives. Similarly to the civilian realm, global digital platforms may also be used in the military dimension, in which case we will term the battlefield-adapted product Digital Weaponry. These kinds of weapons are usually civilian platforms which have undergone software adaptations and military adjustments in areas such as navigation, intelligence, communications, sensing and warning, psychological warfare, and virtual attacks. The cutting-edge technology on which these apps are based, combined with the simplicity and minimal cost of converting them from the civilian to the military realms, is what lies at the foundation of their potential to wield systematic influence on the battlefield.
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Clayton Christensen\u2019s theory on disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997), its adaptation to the military arena by Gautam Mukunda (Mukunda, 2010), and the test cases of the Russia-Ukraine war and the Swords of Iron War between Israel and Hamas in Gaza enabled us to examine how digital weapons have penetrated the modern battlefield, as well as their potential impact on this battlefield and on the global balance of military power. We point out that digital weapons could potentially constitute disruptive innovation on the military battlefield; that it is highly likely that the first actors likely to develop and use it in a transformative way on the battlefield will be low-resource organizations, rather than large and technologically superior military-security establishments; and that due to the convergence of these two trends, digital weaponry has the potential to lead to a certain shift of the global balance of power between military powers with technological supremacy, and terrorist organizations or small countries - at least in several aspects of the modern battlefield.\n <\/p>\n Read more <\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/section>\n \n \n \n \n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Aerospace & Defense is a multidisciplinary academic journal of the Elrom Center for Policy Research and Strategy of Air, Space and Security at Tel Aviv University. The journal serves as a unique research platform for discussing issues of air, space, and security and promotes the publication of research articles presenting analytical, critical, and innovative perspectives. … Continue reading “Home”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":7,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-50","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"yoast_head":"\nHome - Aerospace & Security<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"noindex, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Home - Aerospace & Security\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Aerospace & Defense is a multidisciplinary academic journal of the Elrom Center for Policy Research and Strategy of Air, Space and Security at Tel Aviv University. 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